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In recent years, Twitter has become a 
popular online platform where citizens 
can discuss politics. However, these con-
versations may take an uncivil turn, and 
the consequences could be damaging 
to democracy. One such uncivil beha-
vior on Twitter is trolling, a disruptive 
on line activity geared toward luring 
others into pointless and time-consu-
ming discussion. Disruptive messages 
can have severe consequences for the de-
liberative system in democratic societies 
and could frustrate the development 
of a public sphere. This study explores 
Twitter trolls during the contentious 
2012 Parliamentary election in Cata-
lonia, an autonomous region in Spain. 
Using Gnip’s firehose, all tweets contai-
ning the word “independence” or the 
hash tag “#25N” from the four weeks 
preceding the election were captured for 
analysis, which generated a corpus of 
325,888 tweets. Results based on au-
tomated and manual content analysis 
show that the prevalence of successful 
trolls was at 0.01%, thus indicating 
that they were scant despite the contro-
En els últims anys, Twitter s’ha con-
vertit en una plataforma popular en 
la qual els ciutadans poden parlar de 
política. No obstant això, les conver-
ses a Twitter poden tornar-se incivils, 
amb conseqüències que podrien ser 
perjudicials per a la democràcia. Una 
d’aquestes conductes incivils a Twitter 
es l’anomenat troling, una activitat dis-
ruptiva dirigida a atraure altres en una 
discussió llarga i sense sentit en el marc 
d’internet. Aquests missatges pertorba-
dors poden tenir greus conseqüències 
per al sistema deliberatiu en les socie-
tats democràtiques i podrien frustrar 
el desenvolupament d’una esfera pú-
blica. Aquest estudi explora els trols de 
Twitter durant les polèmiques eleccions 
al Parlament de Catalunya el 2012. A 
través de Gnip, totes les piulades que 
contenen la paraula “independència” o 
el hashtag “# 25N” durant les quatre 
setmanes anteriors a les eleccions van 
ser capturades per a l’anàlisi, la qual 
cosa va generar un cos de 325.888 piu-
lades. Els resultats basats en anàlisi de 
contingut automàtic i manual mostren 
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54 versy surrounding the issue of indepen-
dence. The study also contributes to the 
identification of successful Twitter trolls 
and discusses the democratic implica-
tions of trolling on Twitter.
Key words: Twitter, trolls, political dis-
cussion, elections, Catalonia.
que la presència de trols exitosos va ser 
del 0,01%, cosa que indica que els trols 
van ésser escassos tot i la controvèrsia 
de la qüestió independentista. L’estudi 
també contribueix a la identificació de 
trols exitosos a Twitter i discuteix les 
implicacions democràtiques del troling 
a Twitter.
Paraules clau: Twitter, trols, discussió 
política, eleccions, Catalunya.
Twitter’s potential as a tool for political discussion has been validated in several countries (Conover et al., 2011; Larsson and Moe, 2011; Hosch-Dayican et al., 2014) including Spain (Guerrero-Solé, Corominas-Murtra 
and López-González, 2014). Still, like other types of online discussion, Twitter’s 
democratic potential could be overshadowed by the lack of face-to-face commu-
nication, the opportunity to create multiple accounts, and anonymity, which 
has been shown to lead to incivility (Papacharissi, 2004; Santana, 2013). 
One particular incivity is Twitter trolling (Delclós Juanola, 2013; Mooney, 
2014). Trolling is intentionally disruptive online behavior embedded in an on-
line discussion. Trolling’s end result is wasting everyone’s time, but without ma-
king this purpose obvious —unlike flaming (Hmielowski, Hutchens and Cicchi-
rillo, 2014)—. Twitter trolling may halt an entire discussion or prevent future 
ones, especially with controversial issues. As such, trolling is considered uncivil, 
disruptive, and with negative consequences for online discussion (Golder and 
Donath, 2004). 
Because corralling a Twitter discussion for analysis is challenging (Bruns, 
2012), we know little about the extent of trolling on Twitter, its successes, or who 
the trolls are. This study explores the existence and behaviors of successful Twit-
ter trolls during the electoral campaign for the 2012 Parliamentary election in 
Catalonia, an autonomous region in Spain. This campaign had parties centered 
on the issue of Catalonia’s quest for independence from Spain (Guerrero-Solé, 
Corominas-Murtra and López-González, 2014), making the election particularly 
controversial. During that time, Twitter was gaining prominence as a “forum” 
for political talk (Doval Avendaño and Martínez Rodríguez, 2012), but there was 
a feared anticipation that individuals on either side of the independence debate 
—in Catalonia or outside of it— would fuel incivility on Twitter featuring trolls 
(Pont and Capdevila, 2012). 
The inquiry centers on automated and human content analysis (Abril, Sz-
czypka and Emery, 2017)of all relevant tweets (N = 325,888) collected during the 
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four weeks before Election Day via Gnip’s Twitter firehose (Bruns, 2012). The ad-
vantage of using Gnip’s firehose and not the API (Twitter’s Application Program 
Interface) is that the firehose captures all the tweets sent by all public users (e.g., 
Emery et al., 2014) while the API only distributes an unpredictable fraction of 
tweets (<https://dev.twitter.com/docs/streaming-apis>), making it an unreliable 
source (Kim, Huang and Emery, 2016).
Considering the importance of political talk for democracy (Huckfeldt, John-
son, and Sprague, 2004; Mansbridge, 1999), even when there is disagreement 
(Abril and Rojas, 2015 ), and potential threats (Yan et al., 2016), ever on Twitter 
(Geiger, 2016), I argue that the analysis of Twitter trolling activity, its patterns, 
and its success may lead to a better understanding of the democratic constraints 
of online discussion in microblogging sites. Moreover, since this may be one of 
the first attempts at exploring trolling on Twitter for a contentious issue, this stu-
dy advances a new route to identifying successful trolling activity. Study results 
may also reveal how Twitter users resolve the global discussion of a local issue 
in real time —just before an election— and in a language other than English, an 
aspect of trolling and incivility that is warranted (Phillips, 2015). 
ONLINE INCIVILITY AND TROLLING
Civility is thought to play a central role in political discussion among democra-
tic societies. Although sometimes civility is confused with politeness (for a re-
view, see Papacharissi, 2004), civility implies consideration for the consequences 
of one’s behavior; that is, “…respect for the collective traditions of democracy” 
(Abril, 2015; Papacharissi, 2004: 267). Under this logic, incivility can be unders-
tood as the collection of behaviors that can threaten democracy or stereotype any 
social group. Incivility is consequential; it reduces trust and legitimacy, which are 
necessary for democratic well-functioning (Papacharissi, 2004; Hmielowski, Hut-
chens and Cicchirillo, 2014). 
As a type of incivility, trolling on Twitter has yet to be explored, with some 
exceptions (see for example Sonnenbichler and Bazant, 2012). However, un-
like this study, Sonnenbichler and Bazant’s research was not focused on tro-
lling. Likewise, they fetched tweets from the API and not the firehose. Lastly, 
there was no information given about the contentiousness of the issues dis-
cussed in the hashtags the authors followed. Therefore, the definition of trolls 
used here is adapted from Herring and colleagues (Herring et al., 2002), who 
analyzed trolls within a controversial context. The Herring study looked at 
trolling on a message board, which is different from a Twitter discussion in 
the number of members, reach, and openness of the discussion. However, it 
is one of the few studies to treat trolls in a meaningful depth. Based on their 
work, this study conceptualizes Twitter trolls as (a) someone who appears 
sincere but is actually not sincere; (b) someone posting tweets designed to 
attract heated discussion and flames; and (c) someone posting tweets wasting 
participants’ time by provoking futile argument and annoying participants 
(Herring et al., 2002: 375).1
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56 In contrast to Herring and colleagues (2002), who were able to study a group 
with well-defined boundaries in terms of topics, the architecture of Twitter is 
very different. Twitter does not allow for the many strategies forums and chats 
employ to combat trolls, like excluding users before entrance, banning users after 
trolling, filtering messages before posting, or disallowing communication bet-
ween users (Herring et al., 2002). In fact, Twitter’s Terms of Use does not contain 
the word “troll”, though they do prohibit abuse of the system and have bounda-
ries regarding what can be posted.
The limited literature on trolling has portrayed trolls as vocational provo-
cateurs, who are apt at steering conversation their way in order to stir conflict. 
Trolls typically generate messages with racist, xenophobic, homophobic, mi-
sogynist, classist, or similar content (Tabachnik, 2012). However, trolls start 
by enticing audiences in order to get (false) “allies” in the discussion. Answe-
ring to the troll’s call is called “feeding the trolls” (Tabachnik, 2012). A troll is 
successful, if users are deceived into believing the troll’s intention(s) and are 
provoked into responding sincerely (Hardaker, 2010). Novices are easy prey 
for trolls in this sense. Contrary, “a troll with no response has failed” (p. 233). 
The more responses trolls get, the more successful and amused they are said 
to be.
One common thread in trolling activity research is the use of foul language 
(Herring et al., 2002; Tabachnik, 2012; Galán-García et al., 2014; Younus et al., 
2014). Though insults do not start at the onset of trolling (otherwise trolling would 
fail or it would be labeled “flaming”; Hmielowski, Hutchens and Cicchirillo, 2014), 
when audiences begin biting the bait and futile discussion ensues, insults emerge 
(Herring et al., 2002). To be sure, flaming does not always mean trolling, and not 
all trolling contains flaming. The difference between trolling and flaming lies in 
the motives (Hmielowski, Hutchens and Cicchirillo, 2014): Flaming does not carry 
deception (Hardaker, 2010), which is an inherent element of trolling. Of equal im-
portance, harassment and bullying are different from trolling (see <www.huffing-
tonpost.com/news/twitter-trolls>). Harassment against women, minority groups, 
or celebrities may emerge during trolling. 
The interest here lies in exploring the presence of successful Twitter trolling 
activity and in uncovering their main characteristics. Because Twitter discussions 
are vast, the choice was to select a particular discussion with time and geographi-
cal boundaries. One such case was the Catalan independence discussion on Twit-
ter, which took place before the 2012 Catalan Parliamentary election (Guerrero-
Solé, Corominas-Murtra and López-González, 2014). 
TROLLS ON TWITTER
Social networking sites like Twitter represent a fertile ground for online democra-
cy since —unlike blogs or forums, which never enjoyed more than a fraction of 
audience-produced content— over 70% of people in the US use social networking 
sites (Brenner and Smith, 2013), i.e. most of them read or post messages, photos, vi-
deos and links. Twitter is the main public online platform (Esquire, 2015).2 There are 
UNMASKING TROLLS: POLITICAL DISCUSSION ON TWITTER DURING THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION IN CATALONIA
57
TR
ÍP
O
D
O
S 
20
16
   
|  
 3
9
few entry barriers, is available in 40+ languages, and its users send over 500 million 
tweets per day (Twitter, 2016). Moreover, Twitter can act as a catalyst for action or 
as a vibrant expression of the public sphere (Habermas, 1989) —at least of unpara-
lleled democratic discussion (Huckfeldt, Johnson and Sprague, 2004; Mansbridge, 
1999; Mutz, 2006)—. 
Twitter’s democratic potential stems from its design and architecture. Get-
ting an account is free and easy if consumers are online. Although some few 
accounts are set up to be private, most accounts are public (the default at sign-
up). Therefore, when conversations emerge, they are experienced by a broader 
audience than the one directly participating in them (Boyd, Golder and Lotan, 
2010). Even those without a Twitter account can observe a Twitter conversation; 
hence, the potential is vast. Numerous scholars have attested to the affordances 
of Twitter as a discussion space (see Boyd, Golder and Lotan, 2010; Honeycutt 
and Herring, 2009).
With these affordances, though, there comes a risk; a risk that someone may in-
terrupt the discussion, ridicule it, or even threaten it. The consequences of this can 
be discouraging since it may shut off participants in the future or prevent new ones 
from joining in. For instance, trolls can deter civil discussion by spreading distrust, 
which would have disastrous consequences for the online sphere (Douai and Nofal, 
2012) and society at large.
To better understand trolls, this study also seeks to characterize Twitter trolls. 
Research on personality traits of Twitter account holders who engage in trolling be-
havior —using metadata or data about user accounts— shows that “psychopathy” 
and “Machiavellianism” are typical (Sumner et al., 2012). Psychopathy is typified 
by a lack of empathy and guilt, persuasive speech, pathological lying, a grandiose 
sense of self-worth, anti-social and promiscuous behavior, and a parasitic lifestyle 
(Sumner et al., 2012, p. 387). Machiavellianism consists of deceiving and manipu-
lative tendencies toward others, usually for personal gain (p. 387). Similarly, trolls 
seek to disrupt spaces and attract responses (Herring et al., 2002), which on Twitter 
may translate into hashtag communities or tweets directed at accounts (people or 
organizations). Lastly, trolls also hack names to resemble known accounts (Meta-
xas and Mustafaraj, 2013) or use fake accounts, and tend to have recent accounts 
(Sumner et al., 2012). 
THE CASE OF THE 2012 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION  
IN CATALONIA
Catalonia is an autonomous community of Spain with a distinct language, his-
tory, government, law, culture, and traditions (Generalitat de Catalunya, no date). 
Although Catalans have always felt different from Spaniards (Llobera, 1983), recent 
events have exacerbated this tendency. First, a mounting dissatisfaction among the 
general population since the 2008 recession. Second, an increased denial of auto-
nomy from the central government in areas such as education and Catalan lan-
guage use, which culminated in the Supreme Court overturning the 2006 Statue of 
Autonomy proposal in 2010. Alongside, these developments, younger generations 
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58 are being brought into the job market with prospects of over 50% unemployment. 
Younger Catalans are also a generation now placing more emphasis on Catalan 
traditions (Serra and Puig, 2012) than their older counterparts. This situational con-
text has created a suitable setting for the independence sentiment to flourish. In 
2012, independence supporters outnumbered detractors for the first time in mo-
dern history (El País, 2014), a statistic that has since continued to flock around 50%. 
In 2012, on Catalonia’s National Day (September 11), about 1.5 million mar-
ched in the streets of Barcelona to defend Catalonia’s independence, becoming the 
most-attended national day in history. The then Catalan government seized that 
opportunity to end the legislature and run an early election that same year with the 
intent to win even more seats in congress and lead Catalonia toward indepen dence.3 
The entire focus of that election was Catalonia’s independence, forcing other parties 
with ambiguous independence positions to take a side. The election was set to take 
place on November 25, 2012, and the campaign to start two weeks prior. However, 
pre-campaign activities started right after the call and intensified toward the start of 
the official campaign period —the rationale for four weeks of data—. 
In Catalonia, only 9.6% of adults have a Twitter account, yet 15.5% of them ob-
tain information about political debates from Twitter and 29% said they obtained 
a lot of information from the network (Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió, 2016). In recent 
elections, Twitter has been used for information seeking, news search, opinion ex-
pression, discussion, and polling, precisely because of the importance of Twitter’s 
reach in Spain (Barberá and Rivero, 2015) and in Catalonia (Salcedo, 2013). 
Even though Catalonia is a region with about nine million people, Catalan is an 
official language on Twitter and one of the top 10 languages in terms of internet pe-
netration (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015). Around elections, discussions on Twit-
ter have been abundant and heated, making Twitter a democratic space for political 
discussion (Barberá and Rivero, 2015). During the 2012 election campaign, Twitter 
echoed the heated discussion among Catalans —and between Catalans and Spa-
niards— about the legitimacy, likelihood, and projection for Catalan independen-
ce. Because the independence issue was polarized (Salcedo, 2013), the Catalan in-
dependence discussion on Twitter exemplifies a fertile ground for trolling (Conover 
et al., 2011). Given an election whose main purpose was to gauge the independent 
movement, in which Twitter echoed the independence discussion and in which 
the potential for trolls was heightened, the following research question is proposed: 
•	 RQ1: What was the extent of successful trolling activity in the Catalan inde-
pendence discussion on Twitter? 
To better understand trolling behavior, this study also seeks to identify some of 
the trolls’ features. Provided the general presence of Psychopaths and Machiavellia-
nists, hashtag and top account hackers, usernames that resemble known ones or are 
fake, accounts that are young, and the possibility that more features may emerge in 
trolling behavior, the following research question is posed: 
•	 RQ2: What were the characteristics of successful trolls in the Catalan inde-
pendence discussion on Twitter? 
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METHODS
Data
The population consisted of all tweets generated during the four weeks before 
the Parliamentary Election in Catalonia using the fetch words “independència” 
(Catalan for independence), “independencia” (Spanish for independence)4 or 
“#25N” (the hashtag for the day of the election), which generated 434,507 units. 
Although the official campaign spanned two weeks, the discussion had been hea-
ted in weeks prior (Gordillo, 2012), so collecting four weeks before Election Day 
provides sufficient tweets for analysis. By using the GNIP PowerTrack (Twitter 
Firehose) to capture the tweets, it allowed to include all the units in the search. 
Most Twitter fetches in published research use the API feed —sampling from the 
search words at a rate not always known, and thus compromising the ability to 
calculate recall—. Even though some researchers claim that for large datasets like 
this the API performs nearly as good as the Firehose (Morstatter et al., 2013), data 
from previous analyses suggests this is not always the case and it can be challen-
ging to predict in advance (Bruns, 2012; Kim, Huang and Emery, 2016).  
Among the collected tweets, a computerized content analysis for relevancy 
uncovered that about 24% of them were irrelevant to the Catalan independence 
discussion, thus leaving a corpus of 325,888 relevant tweets for analysis. Hence, 
precision (the ability to avoid extraneous tweets) was at 76%, which is below the 
desirable goal of about 90% (Stryker et al., 2006). Nevertheless, it would have been 
problematic to achieve better precision given that, at the same time of the Catalan 
Parliamentary election, there was the general election in the United States, and 
the peoples of Puerto Rico were voting on their own independence. Precision was 
calculated via human coding of a sample (n = 500), and then letting the system 
(Texifter) learn and machine code the rest. The intercoder reliability for the human 
coding was Kappa = .91, which is acceptable (Landis and Koch, 1977).
The ability to accurately retrieve items of interest as discussed in Stryker and 
colleagues (2006) —what is called recall— could not be assessed because the resear-
cher did not test additional words that could imply independence without using 
the actual “independence” word. Therefore, the exact population of tweets relevant 
to the independence discussion (without using the fetch words) is unknown. 
ANALYSIS
Trolling activity is, by definition, deceptive (Donath, 1999; Herring et al., 2002), 
but deception in an online environment is extremely problematic to capture 
—even with computational linguistics since there is no single cue for deception 
(Hirschberg, 2010)—. To infer latent meaning such as deception, researchers re-
quire sophisticated computational techniques like latent semantic analysis (Ki-
reyev, Palen and Anderson, 2009) or latent topic models (Xu et al., 2011). Some 
scholars have been able to detect deception in online dating profiles (Toma and 
Hancock, 2012), but they described their deception as “high stakes”, while the 
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60 deception for the independence discussion had lower stakes. Moreover, Toma 
and Hancock were tasked with searching for deception in a corpus of units for 
which there was a structure (online dating profiles), whereas the tweets about the 
independence discussion do not have such structure. 
Therefore, this analysis takes an indirect route to finding successful trolling 
activity: The researcher captured trolls using profanity. This is not to say profa-
nity equals trolling. But successful trolling, most of the time, contains traces of 
profanity in the thread. Two strands of research support this choice. First, psy-
chopathy and Machiavellianism (Sumner et al., 2012) —characteristics of Twit-
ter trolls— lend themselves to profanity (Sumner et al., 2012). Second, research 
on trolling in other online communities, such as public forums or discussion 
boards, notes that trolls utilize profanity when discussion fades (Donath, 1999) 
or after the “victim” baits (Herring et al., 2002; Golder and Donath, 2004). Basi-
cally, foul language is typical for successful trolls (Herring et al., 2002; Tabachnik, 
2012; Galán-García et al., 2014; Younus et al., 2014). 
To capitalize on this characteristic of trolling behavior, tweets with profanity 
were extracted.5 This yielded 1,972 tweets, the profanity population (0.61% of 
the relevant corpus). Minor insults or swear words did not generate a considera-
ble list of tweets, contrary to what happened with stronger swear words. 
Since not all profanity denotes trolling behavior, further analysis is warranted. 
A characteristic of trolls is targeted behavior, not mass-oriented (Golder and Do-
nath, 2004). Trolls have a group of people or individual in mind when they attack. 
Therefore, I argue that trolling behavior ought to contain a popular hashtag (#) to 
enter a particular discussion space or an “@” mention to be directed at an account 
(individual or group)—or both. Filtering the set with these criteria yielded 1,275 
tweets or 0.39% of the corpus. 
Furthermore, retweets (RT) and modified tweets (MT) were eliminated be-
cause they do not correlate with Machiavellianism or psychopathy (Sumner 
et al., 2012). In total, 491 tweets (about 25% of the tweets with profanity and 
0.15% of the corpus) constituted the set of messages for analysis of potential 
successful trolling activity.  
To detect successful trolling activity among the 491 tweets, manual coding 
was conducted based on the following two criteria: First, successful trolling 
activity had to at least generate a response; a conversation. Otherwise, they 
remain unbitten bait or flaming. The response from the “victim,” was also 
analyzed to see whether they killed the troll or bit it. Second, and based on 
the study’s definition of Twitter trolling, trolling activity must entail a con-
versation (Herring et al., 2002) in which the troll exhibits any of the following 
behaviors: manifestation of sincerity, flame bait, attempts to provoke futile 
arguments, attempts to annoy, and ideological manipulation. In order to do 
this, each one of the tweets will be expanded to read the entire conversation 
stream if present. Overall, this analysis will illustrate the trolling path from 
laying bait to successful trolling, in which a string of responses will exhibit 
the “victim” biting the bait. 
In order to analyze who the trolls are, the analysis of the potential 491 trolls 
operationalized the following features. (a) Psychopaths and Machiavellians tend to 
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have higher Klout (Sumner et al., 2012). (b) Trolls try to hack hashtags to become 
trending topics (Recuero, Amaral and Monteiro, 2012). (a) Because trolls are desig-
ned to attract responses (Herring et al., 2002), they may most likely be directed at 
known accounts (i.e., accounts from stakeholders in the conversation). (d) Trolls tend 
to have user names that resemble those of key players in a discussion like political 
parties, media figures (Metaxas and Mustafaraj, 2013), or simply fake account names 
(Rafferty, 2011). Finally, (e) since most trolls tend to create accounts shortly before 
they start trolling, the search for trolls will be centered on younger accounts,6 that 
is, relatively new accounts created shortly before the election (Sumner et al., 2012). 
RESULTS
In responding to whether there were any trolls in the Twitter independence dis-
cussion (RQ1), the behavior of the 491 potential trolls7 was analyzed. Of these, 
only 105 (21.39%) generated any response. Of these 105 tweets with potential 
trolling behavior, only 23 were actual successful trolls. The intercoder reliability 
for the human coding was Kappa = 1 in the potential trolling set, which is ac-
ceptable (Landis and Koch, 1977). To double-check the likelihood of capturing 
successful trolls was valid and reliable, a new random sample of the Twitter inde-
pendence discussion (non-profanity population; n = 200) was selected for further 
analysis (human coding) of trolling behavior. Each of the sample tweets was read, 
together with the discussion in which they were embedded (if so). Within this 
sample, no successful trolls were found. The intercoder reliability for this random 
sample was Kappa = .96, also acceptable (Landis and Koch, 1977).
 Below is an example of a successful troll8 (account names are blinded):
A
Lo de Toni Cantó es lamentable, además de ser un actor mediocre, se ríe del nacionalismo ca-
talán, Unión, SI Progreso y Democracia? NO [That about Toni Cantó is unfortunate, besides being 
a mediocre actor, he laughs at Catalan nationalism, Union, YES Progress and Democracy? NO]
B
 
@A qué poco humor tenéis [You have little humor]
A
@B humor? Eso es reírse de miles de personas que manifiestan pacíficamente sus ideas inde-
pendentistas. [Humor? This is actually laughing at thousands of people who peacefully protest 
their independence ideas.]
B
 
@A si es que es para reírse, eso de la independencia es cosa de risa. Cuándo fue Cataluña inde-
pendiente? Todo es un mamoneo [It is totally laughable, that independence thing is a joke. when 
was Catalonia independent? it sucks]
A
 
@B eres un ignorante, Cataluña desde siempre ha tenido sentimiento independentista, yo con 
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dence sentiment, with fascists like you, I do not speak. Suck it up;)
B
 
@A ignorante eres tú, subnormal, facha? Pero qué perro de mierda eres si te tengo delante ...más 
fachas que vosotros nadie perro [the ignorant is you, retarded, fascist? but what kind of a dog are 
you if I were in front of you… Nobody is more fascist than you bitch]
A
 
@B si estoy delante tuyo qué?? Así sois los fascistas siempre amenazando con violencia jaja que 
payaso eres chaval [if I’m in front of you so what? Fascists like you are always threatening with 
violence ha ha what clown you are, boy]
***B
@A estás trastornado, no me extraña que queráis la independencia, solo veis enemigos, fachas, 
fascistas... joder el retraso te corroe [you’re deranged, no wonder you want independence, you only 
see enemies, fascists, fascist ... fuck your retardness is gnawing you]
A
@B Eee para el carro, yo no soy independentis-
ta, no soy ni catalán, soy navarro y también me siento español, pero… 
 [hey, hold your horses, I am not independentist, I am not Catalan, I am from Navarra and I also 
feel Spanish, but…]
A
@B no soy un español que pierde el culo por El Rey y grita Viva España como un baboso 
sin sentido. Esa España no, esa es de los ricos [I am not a Spaniard who is losing his ass for The 
King and shouts Long Live Spain like a drooler without any sense. This Spain no, this is the one 
for the rich]
A
@B y de los capitalistas manipuladores que se lucran a nuestra costa [and the one that be-
longs to manipulative capitalists who profit at our expense]
B
 
@A ya vale de lamentaciones, se sabe que tenemos chupones en to-
dos los sitios, lo peor d todo es que se aprovechan para remover... 
 [enough about lamenting, we all know we have money suckers everywhere, the worst is that 
they take advantage to remove..]
Within the potential trolling set, on several occasions, trolling activity ended up with 
participants in the conversation apologizing to each other for the misunderstanding, 
thus killing the troll. That would be an example of an unsuccessful troll. For instance:
A
què deia la manifestació de l’11S? Catalunya nou Estat d’Europa ... l’enquesta ho corrobora 
#25N #dbtcataluña [what did the 11S protest say? Catalonia the new European state…. The 
survey supports this #25N #dbtcataluña]
***B
@A habla español que no se te entiende, que sus vais a joder, de independencia nasti de 
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plasti [speak Spanish otherwise you cannot be understood, you are going to be fucked, no nee 
nee independence]
A 
@B ui es que no me dirigía a ti, perdona, ya lo haré en castellano. [oh I wasn’t talking to you, 
sorry, I will do it in Spanish .]
C
@A @B eres la mar de amable verdad? Que educación chico! [you are so polite, right? These 
are manners, boy!
B
@A mil disculpas, lamento lo sucedido, creo que me equivoque al tweettear, saludos y discul-
pas [my apologies, I am so sorry for what happened, I think I made a mistake tweeting, greetings 
and apologies]
A
@B comprensible. Buenas noches [understandable. Good night]
It is also important to add as a follow-up to RQ1 that results showed most state-
ments of disagreement were not part of any trolling activity. There may be more 
potential trolls than this study has found —since the analysis was designed to 
capture successful ones— but I suspect there would not be much more successful 
trolling activity than what has been reported here. From the successful trolling 
set (n = 23), most trolling activities used indirect attacks, innuendo, or insinua-
tions rather than direct attacks or accusations.
Table 1. Comparisons across Groups
Variable Corpus Trolling
Klout score 49.13 38.19
Top hashtags over all hashtags 49.435% 45.24%
Top user mentions over all mentions 13.86% 41.37%
Fake accounts 64.29%
N 325,888 23
To know who the trolls were and what their trolling pattern was (RQ2), an analysis 
of the characteristics of the corpus of tweets and the 23 instances of successful tro-
lling activity was conducted (collected in Table 1). In comparison, accounts with 
trolling activity did not have a higher Klout than the general overall corpus, con-
trary to Sumner et al.’s results (2012). They did not use more top hashtags over 
all hashtags (Recuero, Amaral and Monteiro, 2012) either. However, these trolling 
accounts used more top mentions over all mentions (Herring et al., 2002) than the 
entire corpus. 
About 64.36% of the trolling tweets came from fake name accounts or concealed 
accounts. The account age of the trolling tweets was checked and none of them 
were younger than a month counting from Election Day. The oldest account was a 
bit over five years, while the youngest was two months. 
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64 The analysis also revealed that there were accounts created exclusively to troll; 
but trolling was also an occurrence in genuine accounts. Numerous accounts with 
an explicit agenda (e.g., anti-Catalan, anti-Spain, pro-Madrid, anti-corruption) were 
also found among the successful trolling set. Yet, since their motives were always 
displayed, there was little trolling activity taking place on their part. Troll attacks to 
these accounts went unbitten. 
In conclusion, most of the independence discussion was captured (precision 
was 76%), containing 325,888 relevant tweets. Out of these, 1,972 profanity tweets 
were spotted and content analyzed. Yet, only 23 tweets generated a successful tro-
lling response. This means that out of the corpus of relevant tweets analyzed, only 
0.01% constituted trolling activity, a substantially low amount. 
DISCUSSION
This study sought to assess the existence and behavior pattern of successful trolls for 
the Twitter discussion of the Catalan independence during the 2012 Parliamentary 
election. The first research question dealt with the existence of successful trolling 
activity. Results showed that there was some successful trolling activity as exempli-
fied in the 23 tweets, but these only represented 0.01% of the corpus. Fortunately, 
this result does not represent a remarkable amount and it mimics the findings by 
Sonnenbichler and Bazant (2012), who did not find trolls in their analysis of hash-
tag communities and those of Papacharissi (2004) who found that incivility and 
impoliteness did not dominate online discourse. 
A lingering question is why trolls have generated such media fuss (Delclós Jua-
nola, 2013; Mooney, 2014). One explanation could be that even one successful troll 
in a meaningful discussion can have negative consequences (e.g., see Herring et al., 
2002). These consequences could be then amplified and diffused in the mass media. 
Similarly, the effect of trolls and other incivility such as flaming can be damaging, 
even in low amounts (Hmielowski, Hutchens and Cicchirillo, 2014). Still, unders-
tanding the underlying infamy of trolls in the media is an aspect that only future 
research can tackle. 
Thinking about how to capture trolls, the present study noted that analysis of 
a non-profanity random set yielded no additional trolls, thus providing support 
for the methodology employed: Catching potential trolls via profanity and a few 
rules that can be computerized (like the presence of mentions, hashtags, or the text 
(tweet) being embedded in a conversation) is effective. However, this method does 
not provide a set of baiting or potential tweets that are not successful (i.e., not res-
ponded to but that still could be damaging to democratic discussion). Let’s remem-
ber that, at the baiting stage, profanity is not yet employed, and so these tweets 
were not captured by this study. But detecting potential trolling tweets is difficult 
because deception (used in the baiting stage) cannot be detected with machine 
coding (Hirschberg, 2010). 
The second research question inquired about the characteristics of these trolls. 
The analysis of the 23 successful trolling tweets revealed that trolling account hol-
ders (trolls) did not have a higher than average Klout (Sumner et al., 2012), or ratio 
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of top hashtags over all hashtags (Recuero, Amaral and Monteiro, 2012). Their ratio 
of top user mentions over all mentions (Herring et al., 2002), on the other hand, 
was higher than in the general corpus of tweets. This result together with the low 
incidence of successful trolling activity may indicate either an apprehension to con-
flictive discussion on Twitter—the potential trolls accomplished silencing a demo-
cratic discussion—or an aversion to trolling behavior. The former is not desirable 
for democracy, but the latter may be advantageous for democracy if uncivil discus-
sion is ultimately shut down. After all, disruptive messages can have severe conse-
quences for the deliberative system in democratic societies (Herring et al., 2002; 
Hmielowski, Hutchens and Cicchirillo, 2014) and could frustrate the development 
of a public sphere. However, this is a question that only a study asking Twitter users 
can answer, and which lies outside of the this study’s purview. 
Some limitations in this study should be noted. First, recall could not be asses-
sed because fetching tweets that discussed the independence aspect of the 2012 
Parliamentary election without using the word independence or the hashtag #25N 
was difficult. However, the corpus of 325,888 should provide significant insight 
into the main conversational and trolling-related aspects of the discussion. Second, 
there may be successful trolling behavior without profanity. However, most litera-
ture consulted indicated profanity shows up in trolling behavior, either on the troll 
or the “victim” side (Donath, 1999; Herring et al., 2002; Golder and Donath, 2004; 
Sumner et al., 2012; Hmielowski, Hutchens and Cicchirillo, 2014). Moreover, the 
additional analysis outside of the profanity set showed that there were not additio-
nal trolls. 
Despite these limitations, this study makes a positive contribution to the analy-
sis of incivility on Twitter and trolling, in particular, for a contentious local issue: 
the Catalan independence discussion. Study analyses take an empirical look at a 
naturally-occurring setting (i.e., not in the lab), which provides ecological validity 
by working with a population of tweets rather than a sample. Further, this study 
advances a new procedure for identifying trolls through profanity, which may serve 
future studies on Twitter or other online platforms identify this type of incivility. 
Other types of incivility, however, remain unexplored here.
Lastly, the results here underscore a Twittersphere in which users decide to solve 
their discussion viewpoints without resorting to trolls. Thus, it so seems like the 
discussion was closer to the democratic ideal of an online conversational space 
(Honeycutt and Herring, 2009). 
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66 Notes
1 Hardaker (2010: 237) has a similar defi-
nition. Yet she did not quantify types of tro-
lling activity (successful versus not).
2 Only behind Facebook, but Facebook’s 
capacity to connect to the offline world (like 
TV news) or Facebook’s openness is second to 
Twitter.
3 Though this assertion remains a conten-
tious subject.
4 Twitter developers (dev.twitter.com) 
pose that fetches without accents usually 
bring both the word with and without ac-
cents; however, to be sure, I included both 
terms to warrant a complete fetch. I could 
not find a source that would guarantee that 
searching without accents would fetch both 
words.
5 The most used insults and their va-
riants from <http://www.taringa.net/posts/
humor/5029775/Listado-de-insultos-en-espa 
nol.html> and <http://webs.racocatala.cat/
cat1714/insults.htm> were used.
6 Using <http://twbirthday.com/>.
7 Three of these 491 tweets were removed 
afterwards by their account holders, or the ac-
count was deleted.
8 *** Indicates the tweet captured with the 
search.
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